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The use of the bowtie diagram has become widespread in the oil and gas industry as a 
communication and identification tool for hazardous events. The technique has proven to be very 
useful in the determination of safety critical equipment, when used in a simplistic manner. On 
the other hand, its complex applications extend towards developing and maintaining performance 
standards, procedures, etc.  
 
The bowtie technique is used to record barriers – both preventive and mitigative. But having 
recorded barriers, it is useful to be able to take a view on how effective these barriers are, and 
how well you are protected from the identified threats and potential consequences. There are 
several tools available in the industry to estimate this quantitatively. Just like the known 
quantitative risk techniques, these methods come with their own set of complexities. For 
assessing barrier effectiveness, is this complexity needed? 
 
This paper provides a qualitative methodology for estimating the effectiveness of barriers, which 
can be considered as a screening process that can both focus OPEX and identify areas where 
barriers may need to be reinforced or added to. The method accounts for a variety of factors such 
as safety measures being fail-safe, and the possibility of safety system overrides. 
 
One of the major benefits of the bowtie technique is to assist in the development of key 
performance indicator metrics. It gives an insight as to how well protected a facility is against 
accident events and supports operational managers in making risk based decisions, e.g. making 
choices on how to focus OPEX spend.  
 
With continued development of new sources for oil and gas production, the risk to surrounding 
public receptors has been a growing concern in the industry. Questions arise about how to best 
implement safeguards and position detectors, respond to emergencies, and better protect 




Bowties are increasingly used as a means of communicating both the Threats can lead to an 
undesirable event (referred to as a “Top Event” which are generally the loss of control of a 
Hazard) such as a loss of containment of flammable liquids, and what this Top Event can lead to 
(Consequences), such as a pool fire leading to multiple fatalities. The Barriers that are provided 
to prevent Threats from leading to a Top Event; and Recovery Measures (often also referred to as 
barriers) provided to respond to the top event to prevent, limit the effect or respond to a potential 
Consequence are then added. Many, if not all barriers can be considered as safety critical 
systems, or elements.  
 
In reviewing a bowtie, it has typically been difficult to gain a realistic appreciation of how 
effective the provided protection is against the identified threats, or how well equipped to 
respond to a top event to prevent or minimise the impact of a consequence. If a robust view of 
the effectiveness and hence adequacy of barrier (at least relatively) is available, this can give 
insight into the safety of the facility. 
 
One approach, that of counting the number of barriers and recovery measures, has been used 
both explicitly and implicitly, since people tend to feel better protected if they can see multiple 
barriers and recovery measures on each threat and consequence line. This approach, however, is 
not effective and can provide a false sense of security. It also does not give any indication of 
which barriers are, for example, most vulnerable to being degraded if regular maintenance or 
testing is not performed on time (it also relies on people’s common definitions of what 
constitutes a barrier – which is often not accurate). 
 
Pressures on operators to reduce OPEX require that budgets are used wisely, and the current 
approach to using bowties does not support this, nor in the authors’ opinion does it help with risk 
reduction. 
 
Whilst this paper will focus on process safety related examples, the same challenges exist for 
environmental incidents. For the purposes of this paper, recovery measures are referred to as 
barriers (unless in it necessary to draw the distinction from barriers on the left hand side of a 
bowtie). 
 
Overview of current practice 
 
Bowties have become increasingly widely adopted as a communication tool, but they are not 
generally used in the design process (other than to record what is being provided), nor as a 
decision support tool to assist operational managers in managing risk. However, as their use has 
become more established, expanding their application would provide a clear view of the level of 
protection provided against major accident events, and provide a valuable decision making aid. 
 
  
However, current practice in developing bowties is not consistent, with a number of variations in 
the conventions used when developing them. Whilst for some applications this may not present a 
problem, in the context discussed in this paper of barrier effectiveness assessment, consistency is 
essential. 
 
Examples of the variations that exist are: 
 
 Definition of top events – Most bowties adopt the approach that a Top Event is the loss of 
control of a Hazard, with the hazard being shown on the bowtie diagram above the top event. An 
example is shown in Figure 1: 
 
 
Figure 1 – Typical bowtie representation of a hazard and top event 
 
 
This approach can be adopted at an asset level (e.g. loss of containment from the whole pressure 
containment envelope), or a system/module level (e.g. loss of containment in the gas 
compression module).  
 
Another approach is to define the “hazard” as an activity such as top-hole drilling, and then have 
a Top Event representing a specific type of incident that could occur when conducting that 
activity, such as release of shallow gas. Defining the Top Event as, for instance, fire or explosion 
and the consequences as being fatalities, evacuation etc. has also been observed. 
 
 Barrier type – There are two main approaches to what are shown as barriers on bowties: 
1. Hardware barriers – where these barriers are physical in nature such as pressure 
containment systems, shutdown systems (this could include separation distance, as well as more 
obvious barriers). Procedures, human interventions and training/competency etc. (that 
collectively can be described as “soft barriers”) that are required to activate and/or maintain a 
hardware barrier in suitable condition can be treated as escalation controls. These controls act to 
stop escalation factors that could undermine the functioning of the barrier.  
2. A mix of hardware barriers and soft barriers, such as procedures, human interventions, 
competency/training etc. 
 
This difference between these two approaches is illustrated in the two simple examples below. 
 




Figure 3 – Bowtie showing soft barriers as escalation controls 
 
 
 Barrier completeness – It is common to see bowties where, for example, flame detectors 
appear as a barrier, with the ESD system and deluge as separate barriers. This approach can, 
however, lead to the perception that a facility is better protected than it actually is. An alternative 
approach (and in the view of the authors, a clearer one) is to only identify barriers that on their 
own are able to eliminate or significantly reduce the likelihood of a threat, or prevent or 
significantly mitigate a consequence. With this approach, it is clear that detection on its own is 
not a barrier, as it alone does not do anything to e.g. shut down the plant or sound an alarm. The 
combination of detection, processing of that information and some form of executive action 
(actuation) does constitute a barrier. This definition, referred to as being complete, is based on 
the principle that if any of three elements fails, then the barrier would not be effective. Some 
barriers by their very nature do not require these three components, as they are intrinsically 
passive in performing their role (such as a bund) 
 
 Barrier independence – To gain a clear view of barriers they should also be independent 
i.e. they should not rely on other barriers to work, and should not have any common failures 
points or modes (e.g. having two types of flame detectors, connected back to a common fire and 
gas panel and subsequent actuation, does not constitute two separate barriers, as failure of the 
panel or the actuation would render both types of detectors ineffective). The authors have 
conducted barrier rationalisation exercises, where bowties have been simplified, so that 
component parts and non-independent barriers have been consolidated into barriers that are 
independent (in several cases reducing the number of barriers on a single threat line from over 10 
to two or three). Some of these exercises have been greeted by the response, from experienced 
engineers plant operators and managers, that they now feel less assured of the safety of their 
facility (i.e. they had implicitly taken having lots of barriers as meaning they were well 
protected). 
 
Note: Based on these principles, the two separate barriers shown in Figure 3 should be combined 
(carbon steel on its own will not stop the threat of internal corrosion – its corrosion allowance 
will, however, delay a loss of containment. Chemical injection on its own does not prevent a loss 
of containment - again, it can slow or halt corrosion, but must take into consideration the 
materials used in the containment envelope). 
 
For the purposes of this paper the approach adopted is to define barriers as being hardware, 
complete and independent. 
 
Barrier strength and effectiveness concept 
 
For the purposes of this paper, bowties related to a generic gas processing plant or module are 
used. It is assumed that the gas being processed has a reasonable level of corrosivity (e.g. it is 
wet and contains some H2S). It is also assumed, unless stated otherwise, that the process and 
equipment have been suitably designed and constructed. 
 




















Figure 5 – Bowtie showing single effective barrier 
 
 
In the first example (Figure 4), the pressure containment envelope barrier comprises both a 
carbon steel pressure containment system and chemical injection. The pressure containment 
system is vulnerable to internal corrosion, so whilst it may initially be fully effective as a barrier, 
it will degrade over time as any corrosion allowance is used, potentially rapidly. The second part 
of this barrier, chemical injection, is provided to reduce the corrosivity of the process fluid and 
hence protect the carbon steel. For this to be effective requires human intervention such as 
topping up chemical supplies, setting dossing rates, and maintaining the chemical injection 
system. Hence there are numerous ways that this barrier can be compromised. 
 
In the second example (Figure 5), the pressure containment envelope is constructed out of a 
corrosion resistant alloy (CRA) (assumed to be appropriate for all anticipated process 
conditions).  Provided that this is properly specified and that the process conditions do not 
deviate outside of the expected envelope, this barrier will be effective (against this specific 
threat) and should maintain its effectiveness, without the need for any further active controls or 
human intervention. In other words, this is a simple and passive barrier. 
 
Whilst it is not always practical or financially viable to use CRAs in place of carbon steel and 
chemical dosing, in terms of which approach provides a stronger and more effective barrier, the 
use of suitable CRAs would generally be preferred as this is a more dependable or “effective” 
barrier. This introduces the concept of barrier effectiveness, which is a combination of whether a 
barrier can fully achieve its objective (strength), how reliably it can perform this task (referred in 
this paper to as readiness) and how much reliance is place on a given barrier (criticality). 
 
There are a number of criteria that can be used to assess the strength of barriers and readiness, 
and these are considered below.  
 
Criteria for assessing barrier strength and readiness 
 
Barrier strength is defined in this paper as a measure of the ability of a barrier to prevent a 
threat leading to a Top Event, or in preventing a Top Event leading to an ultimate consequence. 
There are a number of criteria that can be considered as contributing to a barrier’s strength. 
Examples include: 
 
 Capacity, including its speed of response if it is an active barrier, e.g. whether a bund is 
sized to be able to contain the full spill volume that can be released or whether a pressure relief 
valve lifts in time to prevent an overpressurisation leading to loss of containment; its 
sizing/flowrate versus the required level of relief as a measure of capacity; or the speed of 
closure of an ESDV (its leak/passing rate being a capacity measure) 
 
 Suitability e.g. how suitable a deluge system is in preventing escalation from a fire (may 
differ depending on the type of fire, with these being shown as different consequences on the 
bowtie). 
 
Barrier readiness is a measure of how likely a barrier is to perform when required - this is a 
slightly different concept to traditional reliability or availability of equipment. Whilst readiness 
includes consideration of reliability and availability in the traditional sense it also considers e.g. 
the performance of procedural controls, human interactions, current condition and discoverability 
of failure modes. Examples include: 
 
 Relative passive/active nature, i.e. how passive or active the barrier is. Passive barriers 
include bunds, PFP, natural ventilation and separation/layout, while active barriers include active 
fire protection, relief valves, interlocks and shut down systems 
 
 Complexity, i.e. how simple or complex the barrier is. An ESD system (complete with 
detection, processing and actuation) and a Pressure Safety Valve (PSV) are both active barriers, 




Barrier strength and readiness give a measure of the performance of a barrier, with the other 
important consideration being barrier criticality. This is an indication of how much reliance is 
placed on a barrier and how significant a given threat or consequence is considered. This 
includes consideration of the nature of the threat (which can range from e.g. loss of the facility 
with multiple fatalities on and off site down to a nuisance factor), how frequently the threat 
occurs or the proportion of time it is present, and how well supported the barrier is, by other 
strong barriers with good readiness.  
 
A proposed set of criteria are presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 – Proposed Criteria 
Barrier strength 
Criteria Range 
Capacity/Speed/ Redundancy Exceeded/Fully redundant Partial/No redundancy 
Suitability Intended role Unintended role 
Current condition As new Poor 
Confidence in condition Certain Unknown 
Barrier Readiness 
Criteria Range 
Relative activity Fully passive Fully active 
Complexity Simple Reliance on human action 
Failure mode Fail safe Fail to danger or 
undiscoverable failure 
Availability and use of overrides 
(including LOTO) 
No overrides Overrides available and 
regularly used 
Barrier history No history of barrier 
failure (good reliability 
and availability) 




*Nature of threat/consequence Catastrophic event Nuisance factor 
Frequency of threat/consequence Constant Rare 
Reliance on this barrier Multiple barriers with 
good strength and 
readiness 
Single barrier or considered 
the main barrier 
 
*As this paper has considered the use of this approach for major accident events that have 
serious or catastrophic consequences, this criteria will not be considered further here.  
 
Other criteria may be applicable depending on the nature of the facilities being considered. 
 
The ideal outcome when scoring against these criteria would be a high strength and readiness 
rating and a low criticality rating. 
 
Considering the number of barriers, threats and consequences that would be considered for a 
typical facility, it is proposed that a qualitative approach is taken to the scales that are used (e.g. 
as in Table 1.), with a maximum of five values used for each criterion (rated from 0 to 4). Whilst 
it is suggested that a simple summation of ratings for each category (strength, readiness and 
criticality) may give a good indication of the overall “effectiveness” of the barrier, the use of 
weighting factors would be readily incorporated into this model and allows the model to be 
calibrated. 
 
The overall barrier effectiveness rating is defined as: 
 
 
BEn  =  Sn+Rn 
        Cn 
 
Where:  BEn  = Barrier n’s overall effectiveness 
   Sn  = Barrier n’s strength rating 
 Rn = Barrier n’s readiness rating 





Whilst it is considered that all of the above criteria are important, there are some that stand out as 
being “gatekeepers” that must achieve a minimum rating before any of the other criteria have 
much value.  
 
These are Capacity (including speed and redundancy), Condition and the Use of overrides. 
 
If a barrier does not have adequate Capacity, it does not matter if it is in good condition, simple, 
passive etc. As it will not be able to prevent/significantly reduce the likelihood of a Top Event, 
or prevent or significantly mitigate the effect of a Consequence. 
 
Similarly, if it is known that a barrier’s condition is such that it will not work, or if it is known 
that is has been overridden, then other factors’ criteria become worthless. Hence a rating of zero 
against any of these three criteria would default the overall effectiveness to zero (by implication 
this is a dynamic measure for condition and overrides, as when the condition has been restored or 
the override removed, the barrier may have a rating). 
 
The barrier effectiveness model therefore uses a (significant) weighting factor on the 
capacity/speed criteria to account for its importance. A weighting equal to the number of other 
numerator criteria is proposed and is used in this paper. 
 
Example of rating a barrier’s effectiveness 
 
Taking as an example a hydrocarbon processing unit that takes feedstock from a high pressure 
source, and an overpressurisation threat line, Table 2 shows how PSVs could be rated. For 
evaluating the barrier strength, in this case it is assumed that, whilst the total relief capacity is 
acceptable, there are sections of the plant where relief capacity is marginal. The valves were all 
installed when the plant was new and are now four years old, and have not yet been re-
certified/re-calibrated, so there are no grounds to be confident in the condition of the valves. 
Hence, a middle rating for condition and a low rating for confidence in condition is achieved. 
PSVs are a well understood piece of technology, but they are known to stick, thus attaining a 
middle rating for confidence. 
 
Considering the barrier’s readiness, whilst PSVs are not passive, they are self-contained and 
require no human intervention to operate, and as such a good rating is given. They are relatively 
simple, but can fail with a hidden defect (they can stick with no readily available means of 
detecting this). PSVs can also be overridden under a permit system, and the specific types of 
PSVs used have had good experience in many facilities. 
 
For the criticality, it is assumed that this plant does have a significant overpressure threat that 
could lead to a major release of hydrocarbon gas. This threat is considered to be present several 
times a month when e.g. dryers are being switched over, and the PSVs are the main barrier 
against overpressure events. 
  
 


























2 1 2 
Failure 
mode 




3 1 3 Overrides  2     
        
Barrier 
history 
3     
Sub-Total     30    15   3 
Overall rating 15 
 
In this example the overall barrier effectiveness rating is 15, which is low (the maximum 
available with this scoring system is 60, assuming that the denominator is 1). Whilst the exact 
ratings could undoubtedly be debated, this low rating should indicate to management that the 
recertification of these PSVs needs to be expedited and a test programme established to confirm 
that they are functioning as intended.  
 
In the following example in Table 3, a corrosion resistant alloy pressure containment system is 
considered against the threat of internal corrosion. This achieves ratings higher than the PSV on 
a number of criteria (again, assumptions have been made as to the nature of the threat and the 
barrier’s properties), but is a completely passive barrier. This achieves an overall rating of 9.2, 
which is considerably better than the PSV, but the difficulty in confidently ascertaining its 
condition and the level of reliance that can be placed on it prevent it from scoring higher. This is 







































3 1 3 Overrides  4     
        
Barrier 
history 
3     
Sub-Total     30    15   6 
Overall rating 9.2 
 
Table 4 -  Combined Carbon Steel pressure envelope and chemical injection 































2 1 3 Overrides  2     
        
Barrier 
history 
3     
Sub-Total     37    14   6 
Overall rating 8.5 
 
 
Multiple barrier effectiveness rating 
 
The discussion above focuses on the assessment of individual (complete) barriers, however the 
overall effectiveness of barriers, on any given threat line or consequence line, is likely to be the 
primary focus of decision makers. As the definition of barriers used in this paper is of 
independent barriers (i.e. failing does not mean that the overall line of defense is overcome), the 
overall effectiveness rating can thus be evaluated as: 
 




Where:  OEa  = Overall effectiveness of the barriers on a threat or consequence line 
 1 to x  = The barriers on the threat line being considered 
 




Figure 7 – Multiple independent barriers 
 
Considering the example in Figure 7, we already have the effectiveness rating for the PSVs. 



































3 1 3 
Availability 
and use of 
overrides  
2     
        
Barrier 
history 
2     
Sub-Total     22   9   3 
Overall rating 10.3 
 
 































4 1 4 
Availability 
and use of 
overrides  
3     
        
Barrier 
history 
4     
Sub-Total     40   14   3 




The summation of the effectiveness ratings of these three barriers is: 
 
OEa = ∑    
 
  = 15+10.3+18 =  43.5 
 
This compares with the single barrier example for protection against an internal corrosion threat 
(where the effectiveness for the two cases considered in Tables 3 and 4 was rated at about 9 (8.8. 
and 9.2 for the two cases). So is this indicating that the barriers against overpressure are more 
than four times more effective than those for internal corrosion? Recognising that these ratings 
are for a hypothetical set of conditions, where there is a corrosive/wet gas, internal corrosion 
would typically be expected to be one of the dominant threats at some point in time. This, 
however, would not be the case initially when (for the carbon steel case) there would be a 
corrosion allowance that would provide increased effectiveness (in the example the rating for 
condition was relatively high as a fairly recent facility was being considered). This introduces the 
concept of barrier effectiveness over time and how this is not necessarily constant (hence the 
inclusion of Current condition and Confidence in condition). 
 
Practicalities and criteria selection 
 
To maintain this approach as a practical tool, the ratings are assigned in structured multi-
disciplinary review workshops, where threat and consequence lines are considered in turn. Many 
barriers will appear on multiple threat lines, and the effectiveness of the barrier may not always 
be the same, so barriers should be re-rated for each threat and consequence line. 
 
Contribution to managing assets throughout their lifecycle 
 
This approach can be used throughout the lifecycle of a facility, from design to 
decommissioning. Whilst the role of bowties in design has generally been limited to the 
recording of design decisions, this approach provides a tool for considering the adequacy of 
barriers against different threats during design. This allows optimisation of the protection 
provided.  
 
As a facility goes enters operation, this approach can provide a decision support tool to allow 
risk based decisions to be more effectively made and to allow operational expenditure to be 
focused on maintaining the facility’s risk profile at acceptable levels (e.g. prioritising 
maintenance and inspection/testing on the most critical barriers). 
 
It should be remembered that this approach provides a snapshot in time of barrier effectiveness. 
This can be kept current by identifying the data sources that would allow the recalibration of the 
ratings (based on the known condition and operational experience),  which can then be readily 
mapped onto a dashboard to give operational managers a tool for assessing changes to the risk 
profile of their facility.  
 
As a facility enters late life and possibly life extension, this approach can still be used to assess 
how ageing has impacted the effectiveness of barriers. Specific threats associated with late life 
(such as obsolescence of equipment and fatigue becoming a more dominant threat) can be used 
to reassign strength, readiness and criticality values. 
Conclusions 
 
The approach presented in this paper provides a practical means of developing a view of the 
level of protection that is provided on a facility and how this changes over time. It converts 
bowties from being a recording and presentation tool into a valuable element in risk based 
decision making. 
 
